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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
v. MORENO-THE "RED HERRING"
OF SOCIAL WELFARE
The Food Stamp Act' was enacted by Congress in 1964 as the Federal Government's principal step towards alleviating hunger in America.
Congress had two purposes in mind: to raise the nutrition levels among
low-income households, and to stabilize the agricultural economy. 2 At
its inception, eligibility for participation in the program was determined
on a household rather than on an individual basis.3 "Household" at that
time was defined as "[A] group of related or nonrelated individuals, who
are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as
one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food
is customarily purchased in common."'4 In January, 1971, the Food
Stamp Act was amended and household was redefined as:
[A] group of related individuals (including legally adopted children and
legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who
are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one

1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 etseq. (1970).
2. Id. § 2011. The Congressional Declaration of Policy reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote
the general welfare, that the Nation's abundance of food should be utilized
cooperatively by the States, the Federal Government, local governmental
units, and other agencies to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nations [sic] population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income
households. The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing
power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition
among members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural
economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of
food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program
is herein authorized which will permit low-income households to purchase
a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade.
3. Id. § 2014.
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964), as amended 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II,,
1972). The section went on to say that "Mhe term 'household' shall also mean
(1) a single individual living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases
and prepares food for home consumption."
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economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is
customarily purchased in common.5

Thereupon the Secretary of Agriculture declared households in which all
members were not related to each other as ineligible for food stamp assistance. 6 This amendment denied aid to groups who met the income eligibility requirements under the Act, 7 but were eliminated from the program
because all group members were not related to each other.
The complainants included Jacinta Moreno, a fifty-six-year-old diabetic
who lived with Ermina Sanchez and the three Sanchez children. The
two women shared common living expenses and a monthly income of

$208, making food stamps a necessity.

Sheilah Ann Henjy, her husband,

and three children, supported an unrelated twenty-year-old woman as a
member of their household. The Henjys had been receiving $144 worth
of food stamps per month but were denied this assistance under the new
5. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964).
This amendment was declared unconstitutional in United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The Act provided further that "[T]he term
'household' shall also mean (1) a single individual living alone who has cooking
facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an
elderly person who meets the requirements of Sec. 2019(h) of this title."
6. 7 C.F.R. § 270.2(ii) (1973) states:
(jj) "Household" means a group of persons, excluding roomers, boarders,
and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or
child care reasons, who are not residents of an institution or boarding
house, and who are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking
facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common: Provided, That: (1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age,
they are all related to each other; and (2) When more than one of the
persons in the group is under 60 years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60 years of age or older, each of the persons under
60 years of age is related to each other or to at least one of the persons
who is 60 years of age or older.
It shall also mean (i) a single individual living alone who purchases and
prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) an elderly person as defined
in this section, and his spouse.
7. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(a) (1973) states:
Eligibility for and participation in the program shall be on a household
basis. All persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons, residing in common living quarters shall be consolidated into a group prior to
determining if such a group is a household as defined in § 270.2(jj) of
this subchapter.
The Food Stamp Program operates in the following manner: An impoverished
household, in exchange for a sum of money, is issued a coupon allotment of greater
value than the charge paid for such food stamps. These coupons may be used to
purchase food, excluding liquor and tobacco, at retail food stores approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture for participation in the program. These stamps are then
redeemable at face value. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2016 (1970).
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interpretation of "household." Victoria Keppler was a public welfare
recipient whose daughter required instruction at a special school. Because
the institution was located in a high rent district, Mrs. Keppler shared
an apartment with an unrelated woman. The new Keppler household
combination was ineligible for food stamp assistance under the 1971
amendment.
These three households and two other groups, claiming a denial of
equal protection8 and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, instituted an action against the Department of Agriculture and two departmental officials. On April 16, 1972, a three-judge district court,9 in
granting a temporary restraining order, found the "unrelated person" provision to be an irrational classification in violation of the equal protection
element of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 10 and enjoined
the operation of 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, seven to two, that "the classification here in issue
is not only 'imprecise'; it is wholly without any rational basis." United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
Prior to Moreno," the Burger Court had consistently followed the Dandridge v. Williams12 approach in sustaining challenged economic and social legislation classifications by applying the minimum rationality test."3
In Dandridge, the Supreme Court held that a Maryland Department of
Public Welfare regulation which placed an absolute upper limit on the
amount of a grant under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program regardless of family size and actual need did not violate equal protection. Moreno, however, using this same test of minimum rationality found that the food stamp provision's exclusion of un8. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 78 (1954), the Supreme Court for the first
time struck down a federal statute on the basis that it violated the due process clause
of the fifth amendment as a denial of equal protection. The Court stated that discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to violate the constitutional right of equality
guaranteed under due process. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 497
(1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642

(D.C. Cir. 1968).
9. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1970).
10. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C.
1972).
11. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The seven affirming the decision were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist

and Chief Justice Burger were the dissenters.
12.

397 U.S. 471 (1970).

13.

See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971).

1488

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

related households denied equal protection of the laws. The break from
the Dandridge pattern makes the decision unusual: Moreno does not repudiate the old Dandridge equal protection test, but instead refuses to
mechanically rubber-stamp a challenged classification. The purpose of
this note is -to examine why ,the Court when faced with a "necessity" situation--such as one involving food or shelter--did not sustain the classification 'under any rational basis as -the traditional test suggests, and
,to propose that Moreno is not a trend-setting case because its holding is
limited to the particular fact pattern involved.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION METAMORPHOSIS

Any legislative program which applies only to certain defined classes
is necessarily discriminatory. However, only the laws which provide unreasonable classifications or classifications that are unrelated to any
proper governmental purpose have been held in violation of the equal
14
protection provision of the fourteenth amendment.
Equal protection has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis. For many
years, the equal protection clause was limited in scope; it was substantive
due process, and not equal protection, which prevailed during the years
of intensive court interference with state economic regulation. In this period, the equal protection clause was termed "the last resort of constitutional arguments,""' and its initial application was limited to very narrow
and precisely defined situations, such as racial discrimination. However,
as substantive due process became an insufficient instrument to protect
property and personal rights, the reliance upon equal protection as an alternative guardian 6 increased until equal protection supplanted substantive due process as the safeguard of personal liberties. Traditional equal
protection hallmarks minimal scrutiny: any rational classification directed
toward some permissible state objective is sustained.' 7 Economic regula14.

See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.

L. REV. 341, 357 (1949).

15. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
16. The policy of judicial intervention as represented by Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), succumbed to one of judicial restraint, the presumption being
that the legislature knew best. This theory of presumed validity under substantive
economic due process sought any reasonable basis for the legislation. See West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934). Since 1937, the Supreme Court has not struck down a law on the
basis of substantive economic due process.
17. 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard,
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tion remained as untouched under the traditional equal protection criteria
as it had been under the deferential due process' 8 approach.
The New Equal Protection of the Warren Court
New equal protection interventionism which employed a strict scrutiny
approach was a trademark of the Warren Court. With -the appointment
of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court developed a reputation for judicial activism, 19 due in large part not only to its increased use
of the equal protection clause to countermand discriminatory legislation,
but also because of its departure from the minimum rationality interpreta,tion. This new strict scrutiny equal protection test involved a weighing
process which concentrated upon two branches-suspect classes and "fundamental" interests. 20 Legislation within the pale of suspect class or fundamental right was overruled unless a compelling state interest could be
shown. The minimal scrutiny standard, however, still applied to classifi21
cations outside of the two branches of new equal protection.
and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called into question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
18. But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) where in a strictly economic
matter the court found no rational basis under the old equal protection test.
19. See also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
20. Fundamental interests have included the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to a free transcript upon appeal,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and the right of procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Race, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
and alienage, Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) have been traditionally suspect classes. Depending upon the circumstances, illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) and wealth, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) have also been classified as suspect.
See generally Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARiz. L.
REV. 479 (1973).
21. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
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The Burger Court and Means-Oriented Equal Protection

As the Warren Court dissolved, so did the high expectations that fundamental rights would be extended to include welfare, housing, and education, for under the subsequent leadership of Warren Burger the Supreme Court evidenced a reluctance to expand new equal protection. 22
There was an increasing discontentment with the Warren Court's twotiered formulation. Frequently, the Court, while purportedly relying on
old equal protection, struck down challenged legislation for lack of any
rational basis. 23 Hence, the Burger Court means-oriented equal protection 24 design does not examine the rationality underlying a classification,
but rather seeks a substantial relationship between the reason for the clas25
sification and the statute's purpose.
The Burger Court, although generally inconsistent in its application of
the new means-oriented approach, has been uniformly unwilling to extend this approach to the field of necessities. The divided Dandridge26
Court held the Maryland Department of Welfare's absolute upper limit
on AFDC awards constitutional under the old rational basis standard 27
regardless of family size and actual need. This decision erased any hopes
scholars may have had as to the extension of Shapiro v. Thompson28 beyond the fundamental right of interstate travel to welfare legislation generally. 29 James v. Valtierra3 ° held that article XXXIV of the California
Constitution which subjected public housing provisions to state referendum approval was not a denial of equal protection. 31 Richardson v.
22. The Burger Court did continue to apply strict scrutiny in the traditional
areas. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
23. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
24. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
25. Id. at 20-21.
26. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
27. The Court went on to say that in areas of public welfare, there was no reason to apply a different constitutional standard than that utilized in the regulation
of business or industry-any rational basis. See Goodpaster, supra note 20, at 497500.
28. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29. The provision in Shapiro denied welfare rights to residents who had not resided in the jurisdiction for at least one year preceding the welfare assistance application.
30. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
31. Although the classification of poverty seemed obvious, the long history of
initiative and referendum appeared to have decided the case. Id. at 141-43.
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Belcher32 ruled a reduction of social security benefits constitutional.3 3 In
Jefferson v. Hackney34 the Court stated:
So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's
efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject
to a constitutional straitjacket. The very complexity of the problems suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method
of solving them. 35

Lindsey v. Normet36 rejected the argument that housing was a fundamental interest:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of rent or otherwise
contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord37
tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.

This housing case was typical of the Burger Court sentiment towards necessities.
There were fewer equal protection cases in the Supreme Court's 197273 Term3 8 and most of the laws were sustained under old equal protec-

tion. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,39 the
Texas system of financing public education through local property taxes
was held not to operate to the disadvantage of some suspect class nor
to impinge upon any fundamental right of education. 40 However, during
the same term, Moreno,41 in an unexpected departure from the traditional
32. 404 U.S.78 (1971).
33. The appellee argued that the classification was arbitrary because it discriminated between disabled employees who received workmen's compensation benefits
and those who received compensation from private insurance or tort claims. Id. at
81.
34. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
35. Id. at 546-47.
36. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). This case involved an attack on Oregon's judicial procedure for evicting tenants after non-payment of rent.
37. Id. at 74.
38. For a discussion of the 1972 Term's decisions, see generally Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term: Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process
of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973).
39. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40. Here, as in Lindsey v. Normet, the Court deferred to the legislature.
41. 413 U.S.528 (1973).
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approach to the field of necessities, 42 rejected the Dandridge test. 48
MORENO AND THE RATIONAL BASIS

Purposes of the Food Stamp Act
Justice Brennan's majority opinion recognized that the practical effect
of the food stamp provision was to produce two groups of persons: one
class of individuals who lived in households in which all the members
were related, and a second class of individuals who resided in households
including at least one member who was unrelated to the rest. This second group was ineligible for food stamps. 44 The Court first determined
that the challenged statutory classification bore no relation to the stated
purposes of the Act which were to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and
to stabilize the agricultural economy.
[T]he relationships among persons constituting one economic unit and
sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their abilities to stimulate
the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their
45
personal nutritional requirements.

The Court then proceeded to determine whether the challenged classification was rationally related to some other legitimate governmental interest.
42. Decided the same day as Moreno was the companion case of United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). A 1971 amendment to the
Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1964),
which stated that "[Any household which includes a member who has reached his
eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income
tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall
be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program . . . during the tax period
such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such
tax period" was found unconstitutional. The legislative history indicated a concern
over the abuses of the program by college students. As in Moreno, those bringing
the class action were far from being wealthy college students. The Court found the
statute involved an irrebutable presumption that the deduction taken by the parent
for the prior year was a rational indication of the status of a dependent household.
As there was no provision for a hearing to rebut this presumption, the amendment
was held a violation of procedural due process.
43. For an excellent discussion of the Dandridge decision see Dienes, To Feed
the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555
(1970).
44. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1964).
This amendment was declared unconstitutional in United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
45. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C.
1972).
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Fraudas a Rational Basis
The Government advocated that the classification of public welfare
beneficiaries must be sustained if there were any reasonable basis. 46 Appellants first argued that the provision was rationally related to the prevention of fraud.
The food stamp program was subject to abuse in two ways by households
of unrelated persons. There was first the problem of those .who chose to
remain voluntarily poor, adapting their lifestyle to the availability of food
stamps ....
A second form of abuse was the participation in the food stamp program
by persons actually being provided ample financial assistance by relatives
who themselves lived elsewhere; such persons would not be voluntarily
might obtain food stamps by
poor, or even poor at all, but nevertheless
47
not revealing available sources of support.

The Supreme Court rejected the Government's reasoning that the classification should be upheld as a fraud prevention device.
Although Justice Brennan agreed that under the traditional Dandridge48 analysis, a classification did not have to be mathematically precise, 49 he nonetheless maintained that denying food stamp assistance to
all unrelated households which were otherwise eligible was not a reasonable means of treating alleged abuses. 50 Supporting this conclusion, the
opinion cited separate provisions of the Food Stamp Act designed to reach
the very problems mentioned in the appellant's brief. 51 In addition, Jus46. Brief for Appellants at 7, United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973).
47. Id.at 15-16.
48. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
49. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538.
50. In equal protection cases the Court will sometimes declare a rational classification to be impermissible because there are other means available to the state to
achieve its objective which "[W]ill have a less onerous effect upon interests protected by the Equal Protection Clause." This is the principle of the "least onerous
alternative." See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey. A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 39, 58.
51. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970) declares a household ineligible for assistance under the food stamp program "[1]f it includes an able-bodied adult person between
the ages of eighteen and sixty-five" who either fails to register for or accept employment. 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b) (1970) states that:
Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons
or authorization to purchase cards in any manner not authorized by this
chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of the value of $100 or more,
be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both, or, if
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ice Brennan found, as a practical effect, that the regulation excluded
52
those individuals who were in actual need of assistance.
It at first appears surprising that the Court did not sustain the provision on the basis of fraud5 3 under the minimal scrutiny analysis customarily used in public welfare cases54 for as Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion pointed out, if it were not for the constitutional elements involved,
the "unrelated" persons provision could have been supported on this fraud
basis. 55
such coupons or authorization, to purchase cards are of a value of less than
$100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof,
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year
or both.
7 U.S.C. § 2023(c) (1970) provides:
Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for payment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing the same to have been
received, transferred, or used in any manner in violation of the provisions
of this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall be
guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, or, if
such coupons are of a value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
52. The Court noted that two unrelated individuals could avoid the exclusion by
altering their living arrangement so as not to meet the definition of household provided in section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act. United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537.
53. The Burger Court did not accept appellants' argument based on Knowles v.
Butz, 358 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1973). This case held that the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Instruction 732-1, § III(D)(2)(b), which provided that all
individuals who share common living quarters and expenses for such quarters constitute a household for food stamp purposes, was invalid. The district court concluded that 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972) which defined household as a
group of individuals "[L]iving as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common" needed little interpretation. All persons sharing living quarters and expenses for such quarters are not
per se a "household" or even an economic unit; nor is every economic unit per se
a household. Appellants argued that many of the individuals adversely affected by
the 1971 amendment, could, with slight adjustments, have qualified as separate
households under the rationale in Knowles. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 1011, United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
54. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
55. Lawmakers in economic and social welfare legislation have been permitted
to address a problem one step at a time although such a procedure could inflict a
hardship upon some groups. See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion on the right
of association under the first amendment, 413 U.S. 528, 538.
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CONGRESS' TRUE PURPOSE-EXCLUSION OF A
POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR GROUP

There is a temptation on first impression to conclude that the Court
utilized a means-oriented approach in reaching its decision. If this were
the case, the Justices would not have had to delve far beyond the Declaration of Policy of the Food Stamp Act- 6 to strike down the provision.
This enigma is answered in the legislative history of section 3(e). Congress' true purpose in enacting the legislation was a desire to harm a politically unpopular group-"hippies." Legislative categories normally
have myriad purposes. Under a minimal scrutiny test, the Court attempts
to devise a rational interpretation for a legislative scheme. Ordinarily
the most probable purpose of a classification will sustain its constitutionality. When this is not the case, the category's legitimacy depends
upon the extent to which the court wishes to carry the presumption of
constitutionality. 57 The most probable purpose of the 1971 Food Stamp
Amendment-preventing "hippies" and "hippy communes" from participation in the Food Stamp Program-was constitutionally impermissible.5,
The statements of both the Senate and House conferees to the amendment made obvious that such an exclusion was Congress' primary intention. Senator Holland, one of the Senate conferees, evidenced his sentiments:
The next change was that the term 'household' was further defined so
as to exclude households consisting of unrelated individuals under the age
of 60, such as 'hippy' communes, which I think is a good provision of this
bill. 59

Agriculture Committee Chairman Ellender also made it apparent that the
provision was designed to exclude "hippy communes." After indicating
that households including unrelated individuals under sixty would be prohibited from participation in the program, he compared the provisions in
the Senate, House, and Conference versions of the bill:
3. Senate (Section 1(3)) redefines 'household' to include an elderly person eligible for the 'meals on wheels' program.
House does not do this (creating a question as to how elderly persons
who do not have cooking facilities can obtain the coupons to be used by
them to participate in the 'meals on wheels' program).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
57. Supra note 21, at 1079.
58. The provision was not included in either the House-H.R. 18582, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1970) or Senate-S. 2547, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970) bills but was
the product of the Conference Committee. It was considered quickly just before
the New Year's adjournment.
59. 116 CONG. REc. 44439 (1970).

1496

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Conference Substitute adopts Senate provision, plus a provision designed to exclude households consisting of unrelated individuals under the
age of 60 (such as hippy communes).60
The statements of the House conferees also give support to the invidious
legislative intent:
The House bill did not alter the definition of 'household' under section
3(e) of the Act. The conference substitute includes language which is designed to prohibit food stamp assistance to communal 'families' of unrelated individuals.
The substitute, of course, contemplates that the term 'related' shall apply to the relationship between married spouses and to such degree of
blood relation and other legal relation (such as adoption and foster children) that the Secretary by regulation may prescribe. The requirement for
household members to be related does not apply to persons over 60 years
of age. 6 1

This 'brief legislative history clearly confirms that the provision was intended to exclude "hippies" and "hippy communes" from participation in
62
the Food Stamp Program.
Congress merely singled out a certain category of "offensive" individuals. 63 Although statutes normally contain a welter of purposes, the crucial equal protection question is "whether there is an appropriate govern60. Id. at 44431. See id. for Explanation of Food Stamp Conference Report.
61. Id. at 43327. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534.
62. Indeed, six Republican members of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs in a letter to then Secretary of Agriculture, Clifford M.
Hardin, identified the "anti-hippy commune" provision.
1. Definition of Household. Section 3(e) of the law provided a definition of 'household' which meant '. . . a group of related individuals . ..
or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in
common.' The intent of Congress in redefining household in this manner
was already contained in the Conference Report (Report No. 91-1793,
page 8). There the Conferees stated that 'the conference substitute includes languge which is designed to prohibit food stamp assistance to communal 'families' of unrelated individuals.' As Senator Ellender pointed out
on the floor of the Senate (Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
vol. 16, pt. 33, p. 44431), this definition of the provision was 'designated
to exclude households consisting of unrelated individuals under the age of
60 (such as hippy communes).'
The Senators were concerned that the "anti-hippy commune" provision would penalize eligible families "who might happen to have 'taken in' a friend out of kindness."
117 CONG. REc. 14027 (1970).
63. See Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellants at 5 n.3, United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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mental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment. '64 As the
district court opinion6 5 indicates, an intent to harm a politically unpopular
group without reference to some public interest consideration cannot justify the 1971 amendment.6 6 Since Congress' primary reason for the legislation was unconstitutional, the Court under traditional equal protection
might have exercised its imagination to find fraud prevention as a rational basis to sustain the classification; however, the presence of such
blatant "anti-hippy" intent, would have revealed the absurdity of that
interpretation. Moreover, the amendment's effect denied assistance to
those who most desperately needed it. Considering these elements, the
Supreme Court did not have much room for discretion.
The Moreno Court, in considering the factor of social welfare, found
the legislation of Congressional prejudices unconscionable under social
justice. Despite the unjust and inequitable nature of the statutory enactment, the Court could not arbitrarily declare it a denial of equal protection. To remain consistent with previous decisions, the Burger Court
strained not to find a rational basis for the 1971 Food Stamp Amendment. Moreno, an example of a case determined by public policy, is
a decision which could not ignore the element of moral consciousness.
The social interest in prohibiting Congress from legislating against a politically unpopular group outweighed the fraud prevention consideration.
Despite the Court's reasoned elaboration in support of its conclusion,
a manifest element of morality was involved. Perhaps if the legislative
history had not been so revealing, the Court would have upheld the measure as a fraud prevention device. But not even minimum rationality
could ignore the unconstitutional purpose. Moreno provided the judicial
thermidore against Congressional prejudice.
Most importantly, Moreno rejected the Dandridge shibboleth of minimal scrutiny. Previous necessity cases provide no indication of "emerging
equal protection." Although this departure is significant and unusual in
64. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
65. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11
(1972).
66. See Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1971). This case involved an ordinance of the City Council of Carmel which
prohibited climbing, walking, standing or sitting upon any public property not normally used for such purpose. Although the regulation was neutral on its face, the
order was declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection because it was
selectively enforced against "hippies". In striking down the city ordinance, the court
concluded that "[Liaws are invalidated by the Court as discriminatory because they
are expressions of hostility or antagonism to certain groups of individuals." Id. at
864, 479 P.2d at 355, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 155 as cited in Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341, 358 (1949).
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itself, the immediate concern is whether Moreno marks a trend. Subsequent cases have not confirmed the predictions that the Burger era would
subject to strict scrutiny legislation concerning welfare, housing, and education. 67 Moreno, viewed in perspective, may not be a hallmark of
means-oriented equal protection. Indeed, if Congress had been more
subtle in its purpose, the classification would probably have been sustained. The Moreno Court strained not to find a rational basis while
simultaneously restricting its decision to the confines of the traditional approach used in welfare cases.
Rather than indicating a change in Supreme Court equal protection
posture, the decision is a reaction against legislation which blatantly dis68
criminates against a particularly unpopular group of individuals.
CONCLUSION

The Moreno decision should not cause social libertarians to unnecessarily rejoice over its impact as a victory for welfare rights. Furthermore,
those who adhere to a strict rationality need not feel anxiety. The
Court's opinion was based upon a concern over legislative motive rather
than upon any infringement of the necessities of life. The case is significant because it employed a traditional equal protection approach, and
it is not a suggestion that more than a mechanical scrutiny will be applied
to future welfare problems. Consequently, Moreno may generate a good
deal of undeserved controversy and may well be the "red-herring" of
social welfare. 69
A lice S. Perlin
67.
68.

See text accompanying notes 26-43 supra.
Moreno is a sample of the Court's use of the equal protection clause as a

ban against discriminatory legislation. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 314, 357 (1949).
69. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974), the Supreme
Court in a seven to two decision held a New York village ordinance which restricted
land use to one-family dwellings including lodging houses, boarding houses, or multiple dwellings constitutional. The word "family" was defined as one or more persons living as a single housekeeping unit and related by blood, adoption, or marriage

or no more than two persons living as a single housekeeping unit and not related
by blood, adoption, or marriage. The action, brought after owners of a house in
the village were cited for violating the ordinance by leasing their home to six unre-

lated college students, charged the regulation was violative of equal protection, and
the rights of association, travel, and privacy. The Supreme Court, in a majority
opinion delivered by Justice Douglas, held that in areas of economic and social legis-

lation where legislatures have used their judgment, a classification will be upheld
if it is "'reasonable, not arbitrary' (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
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U.S. 412, 415) and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.'
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76." 94 S. Ct. at 1540. The Court, after finding that
the ordinance did not impose any procedural disparities upon any one group or
infringe upon any "fundamental right" sustained the land-use regulation as rationally
related to family needs under the constitutional standard of minimal scrutiny.
The majority opinion distinguished the case from Moreno by noting that the food
stamp provision declared ineligible for participation a household containing anyone
unrelated to the rest whereas the Belle Terre ordinance included within the definition of "family" two unrelated persons. Despite the Court's attempt to distinguish
the two cases, Belle Terre demonstrates the return to minimal scrutiny in areas of
economic and social legislation and the limited effect of the Moreno opinion.

